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Educational governance activities and the 
rise of educational contagion in the  
Islamic Maghreb  
The case of Tunisia 
Tavis D. Jules and Teresa Barton  
Introduction 
Educational governance activities1—the funding, provision, ownership, and 
regulation of education (Dale 2005)—are no longer solely conducted by 
state apparatuses, but are now a permanent feature and orthodoxy of the 
»politics of education« at the transnational and transdiscursive levels. We 
build upon the insights of the »pluri-scalar mechanisms of governance« 
(Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002) to empirically conceptualize the 
scalar dynamics of transitological educational governance activities and 
politics in post-authoritarian and post-revolutionary settings and 
contexts (hereinafter post-spaces) in comparative and international 
education. We use a »historical-comparative or comparative-historical 
approach« (Cowen 2000; Larsen 2010; Schriewer 2002), grounded in an 
historical policy analysis (HPA) (Hanberger 2003; Jules 2013a; Jules 
2013b; Schram 1993; Torgerson 1996) of national educational policies to 
illustrate how various policy discourses arose in the post-authoritarian 
period in Tunisia. Such a methodology illuminates how perceived 
educational problems are first rescaled endogenously by exogenous 
forces during different »transitologies«—the collapses of one empire and 
                                                
1  Following Dale (2005) we use »educational governance activities« as a ge-
neric term to encompass the funding, provision, ownership, and regula-
tion of education that may be carried out independently by different 
actors that are endogenous or exogenous to the nation state.  
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its replacement with another (Cowen 2000)—within the context of the 
project of modernity. We see Tunisia’s post-spaces as consisting of the 
(i) post-independence policyscape, (ii) post-Bourguiba policyscape (first 
authoritarian president), and (iii) post-Ben Ali policyscape (second 
authoritarian president). These post-spaces stem from some form of 
regime change and from internal uprisings and have ultimately shaped 
Tunisia’s transitologies.  
A plethora of studies have concentrated on Tunisia’s political transitolo-
gies by illuminating the precipitous collapse of one of the most unwave-
ring countries in the Arabic world (Chomiak and Entelis 2011; Schraeder 
and Redissi 2011) by drawing attention to several internal factors. These 
include its economic system and excessive unemployment (Hibou, 
Meddeb, and Hamdi 2011), the three perceived myths (economic 
miracle, democratic gradualism, and laicité2) credited to Ben Ali’s regime 
(Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012), and the role of external actors (Youngs 
2011) in the massive uprisings against the regime, as well as the 
conceivable broader lessons that the Arabic world could learn from the 
Jasmine Revolution (Murphy 2011; Pickard 2011). Few studies have 
sought to empirically study the historical impact of Tunisia’s political 
transitologies on educational governance activities. Governance in post-
spaces is a spatial scale based on the outcomes of struggles between 
social forces that are embedded within the contestations of power and 
capability (Robertson 2010). In focusing on Tunisia, the most recent 
state to emerge within post-authoritarian spaces, our emphasis is on 
understanding the political role of the »mukhabarat (intelligence-based) 
police state [based on a] ›strong neo-corporatist state‹ or the ›force of 
obedience‹ or an ›authoritarian syndrome‹« (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 
5–6) in relation to the role and function of education in Tunisian society. 
                                                
2  laicité links economic underdevelopment closely with cultural and religi-
ous backwardness that had to be eliminated through subscription to 
modernizing values and the French model of social development (see 
Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012). 
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This paper draws on political economy literature, particularly on the con-
cept of »financial contagion,« to propose the rise of »educational con-
tagion«—the spreading of ideas due to spillovers—within post-authorita-
rian and post-revolutionary spaces and across different scales. Financial 
contagion occurs as a result of several small economic shocks that initia-
lly affect only a few institutions, a particular region or a specific section 
of the economy, and then begin to spread across the entire economic 
system. The ripple effects of these small shocks are driven by economic 
fluctuations and ultimately lead to a tsunami of policy solutions. In 
applying this concept to an empirical conceptualization of education in 
post-authoritarian and post-revolutionary settings and contexts, we aim 
to understand how educational policy ideas spread across various regions 
of a country. We propose a »a model in which small shocks lead to large 
effects by means of contagion, more precisely, in which a shock within a 
single sector [such as education] can spread to other sectors and lead to 
an economy wide financial crisis« (Allen and Gale 2000, 3). Apropos to 
our argument, educational contagion outcomes may be derived from a 
scalar empirical analysis of educational governance activities in post-
spaces. This paper suggests that countries are subjected to different 
externalities as they construct imagined post-spaces or »imagined 
communities« (Anderson 1991; see also Sadiki 2002) in the aftermath of 
regime changes, since they are greatly influenced by regional and global 
processes. Within this context, this paper sets out to argue that educatio-
nal contagion, embedded within a broader framework of scales, is but 
one empirical approach that we can use to understand how processes of 
globalization and regional integration influence post-spaces. Our starting 
point is the national policy level of the Tunisian educational system. 
Simultaneously, we pay attention to the processes and actors above and 
below the state level, since the pluri-scalar mechanisms of governance 
allow us to understand the »coordination of activities, actors/agents and 
scales through which education is constructed and delivered in national 
societies« (Simons, Olssen, and Peters 2009, 78). 
Our principal argument is that scales help us to understand the rise of 
regulated educational governance activities and the subsequent outcome 
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
4 
of educational contagion in a particular context. First, we recognize that 
authoritarianism is a problematic concept to define and even more 
precarious when applied to the nation-state (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005). 
In conceptualizing educational governance activities, we draw on a vari-
ety of literatures in comparative and international education to show 
how the different levels of »scale« (Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002; 
Robertson 2012), the projectability of »scoptic systems« (Sobe and 
Ortegon 2009), and the broader cultural, historical, and political 
investigation of »vertical studies« (Bartlett and Vavrus 2011; Vavrus and 
Bartlett 2006) within »policyscapes« (Carney 2009) provide an opportu-
nity for us to consider the way in which policy ideas flow within and 
between different aspects of the policy environment in post-spaces. We 
use such an elaborate framework, giving these approaches a particular 
treatment or viewing them through the »optique of globalization« 
(Carney 2011), since one cannot study »post-spaces« in education 
without locating and accounting for the various governance mechanisms 
that have managed and regulated education prior to the emergence of 
new spaces. Second, we make an assessment by employing an HPA 
aimed at exploring the question of how educational policymaking has 
been regulated and governed in Tunisia’s post-spaces. For us, education 
is one of many regulated and governed aspects of the post-authoritarian 
spaces that exist at different scalar levels in Tunisia. Third, this paper is 
an attempt to scrutinize and wrestle with the nature of the problems that 
confront post-authoritarian Tunisia in light of its historical past. This is 
done by briefly reviewing the historical and post-independence aspects 
of education in Tunisia. The premise of this essay suggests that even at 
the height of authoritarianism in Tunisia, education was seen as essential 
and as part of the regime’s civilizing mission. Finally, we gauge the Tuni-
sian example by examining major reform agendas, along with the actors, 
agents, and institutions that promoted them. 
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5 
Post-spaces as vertical comparisons, scopic systems, and 
policyscapes 
In examining the notion of scale in post-authoritarian spaces we draw on 
the work of Robertson, Bonal, and Dale (2002) and Robertson (2012), 
who argue that scales are constructs that take place at different levels 
that are entwined and fixed through different processes. Struggles 
between actors (political and others) may occur at any level within a scale 
and consequently produce different outcomes. Thus pluri-scalar gover-
nance pays attention to how education is delivered and constructed as 
well as to the power relations that arise during the coordination of activi-
ties, actors, and agents at different scales in post-spaces (Dale 2005; 
Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002; Simons, Olssen, and Peters 2009; 
Verger 2009). Whereas Dale’s (2005) work uses a priori elements to sug-
gest that movement towards governance can be categorized by the 
emergence of a multilayer or pluri-scalar process that involves non-state 
actors/agents in national decision-making, our focus here is on the 
posteriori conceptualization of governance activities regarding educational 
politics. In building upon the existent governance research that pays 
attention to the scales of governance (sub-national, national, and 
supranational) in relation to the institutions or agents (state, market, 
community, and household) that coordinate these various scales, resul-
ting in the »coordination of coordination« (Dale 2005; Robertson, Bonal, 
and Dale 2002), our work draws attention to the embryonic scalar dyna-
mics of governance activities before they move up the decision-making 
ladder to the transnational level (Mundy 2007). Educational governance 
is multidimensional, multileveled, and multiscalar, and therefore, 
educational governance activities in post-spaces take place at the 
subnational, national, supranational or regional, and international levels. 
Any analysis of national governance structures should draw attention to 
both the »›politics of education‹ in capitalist societies and to ›education 
politics‹ as specific events within governance structures« (Simons, 
Olssen, and Peters 2009, 79). We therefore examine pluri-scalar patterns 
of coordination since educational reforms in post-spaces are »now being 
asked to do different things in different ways, rather than the same 
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
6 
things in different ways« while on the systemic level »the constitution of 
education sectors may be in the process of changing, with a development 
of parallel sectors at different scales with different responsibilities« (Dale 
2005, 117).  
In essence, we use Robertson’s (2012) typology as a conceptual approach 
to the study of governance activities in post-spaces, and suggest that 
these spaces represent a »›condition of the world,‹ ›discourse,‹ ›project,‹ 
›scale‹ and ›means of identifying the reach of particular actors‹« (35). As 
conditions of the world, processes of globalization, American 
exceptionalism, neoliberalism, and post-Washington censuses shape 
post-spaces. As a discourse, post-spaces are invoked as a means of split-
ting with the past and constructing a revisionist view of history. As a 
project, post-spaces structure the perceptions and scopes through which 
particular educational challenges and solutions are framed. Finally, as a 
scale, post-spaces allow actors to pick and choose which ideas will be 
legitimized and which will be discouraged. Therefore, by empirically 
conceptualizing post-spaces, we can begin to see these spaces as part of a 
vertical landscape within which we can situate past and present discour-
ses in order to understand »multi-layered and cross cutting proceeds and 
modes of interaction« or what has been called »›situatedness‹« or 
»embeddedness« (Robertson 2012, 39). In other words, vertical compari-
sons draw attention to the »politics of knowledge production« (Vavrus 
and Bartlett 2006), particularly in an era of regulated governance in 
which »[…] nation-states continue to be central players in a globalizing 
world, but partly as local agents of global forces, for the nation-state now 
operates within global economic constraints« (Marginson and Mollis 
2001, 601). Such recognition of the changing role of the nation-state 
implies that we need to develop a different empirical approach to situate 
the new geo-political educational architecture of power in a globalizing 
world. 
In returning to the ways in which we can empirically study policy 
discourse in post-spaces, »scopic systems in education« (Sobe and 
Ortegon 2009) invite us to examine how education, historically and in 
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
7 
the present, has been projected globally. Sobe and Ortegon (2009, 59) 
challenge us to use scopic systems in education to think about »projected 
realities (and the means of projection)« (59) that are central to »perfor-
mance legitimacy« (Huntington 1991) in any regime. In heeding this call, 
we take Sobe and Ortegon’s (2009) notion of the projection of globality 
a bit further by suggesting that the »totality and reflexive 
comprehensiveness of projection and reality« (58) is a condition and not a 
process, since it is not a result of technological innovation. Globality is 
seen as a new »condition or state in which things are global,« which 
stems »from conscious and intentional actions of individuals and collec-
tive human actors« (Shaw 2000, 17–18). In locating the array of scopic 
systems that exist in post-spaces, we focus on identifying how these sys-
tems have historically and in the present projected ideas of education. 
Educational scopic systems represent a form of power that frames 
educational challenges within the policy environment and tries to find 
solutions by employing mechanisms that ultimately reinforce social prac-
tices over time (Robertson 2011; Robertson 2012). While scopic systems 
help us to understand the projectability of globality as constructed 
through the national optic, vertical comparisons allow us to »grasp the 
complexity of the relationships between the knowledge claims among 
actors with different social locations as an attempt to situate local action 
and interpretation within a broader cultural, historical, and political 
investigation« (Bartlett and Vavrus 2011, 96). In other words, the context 
within which post-spaces operate, taking into consideration the »histori-
cal trends, social structures and national and international forces [that] 
shape local processes« (Vavrus and Bartlett 2006, 96). Vertical compari-
sons not only help us to understand how projected realities occur in 
post-revolutionary spaces, but also focus on understanding how social 
interactions are shaped by institutional forces, across nations as well as 
across different political periods. These comparisons help us to under-
stand how multilevel dimensions ultimately allow the construction and 
subsequent projection of a version of reality that authoritarian regimes 
strive to maintain in the form of performance legitimacy. At the end of 
the day, legitimacy matters in any post-space, and thus any empirical 
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8 
study of post-revolutionary or post-authoritarian spaces must consider 
the role of performance legitimacy in shaping and constructing a 
country’s identity as projected to the rest of the world. For us, vertical 
comparisons are ways to explain the claims to legitimacy bolstered by the 
persuasive use of state propaganda, the illusion of political inclusiveness, 
the supply of standard public goods, and the dispensing of patronage 
through client networks (Burnell 2006).  
The final element we suggest is critical to understanding post-spaces is a 
focus on policyscapes, as notions of globality are projected across diffe-
rent scales within the policy environment. Like Carney, (2009, 2011), we 
uses policyscape as a way to understand »the spread of policy ideas and 
pedagogical practices across different national school systems« (68). 
However, in applying this notion to post-spaces, the aim is to look at 
policy diffusion through both vertical and horizontal lenses to capture 
the ideological essences that remain after regime implosion, giving rise to 
post-spaces that are focused on creating a new imagined community. 
Vertical comparisons of scales within post-spaces allow us to draw 
attention to the lived consequences of entanglement that exist within an 
imagined community. The aim of such a comparative approach is to bet-
ter understand the horizontal and vertical spatiality of transnational flows 
and how they affect educational systems (see Ferguson 2006). Policy-
scapes allow us to focus on the »time present transitologies« (Cowen 
2000) that shape educational systems and spaces in the aftermath of 
regime collapse, given the changing nature of regional and international 
architecture and their impact upon practices and processes. Transitolo-
gies, for Cowen (2000), have a shelf life of 10 years and stem from the 
collapse and reconstruction of »(a) state apparatuses; (b) social and 
economic stratification systems; and (c) political visions of the future; in 
which (d) education is given a major symbolic and reconstructionist role 
in these social processes of destroying the past and redefining the future« 
(338). If we accept that the Tunisian revolution began December 17, 
2010 with the self-immolation of the fruit vendor Tarek al-Tayeb 
Mohamed Bouazizi, then Tunisia represents a prime example of how we 
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
9 
should study transitologies in post-spaces by drawing from the vertical 
and horizontal scales that exist within the policyscape.  
We shall now turn to historicizing Tunisia’s educational systems to show 
the emergence of Tunisia’s transitological policyscape. 
Transitological educational governance activities in Tunisian 
history 
As noted above, governance can be broken down into independent 
activities—funding, provision, ownership, and regulation—that are 
carried out by different actors/institutions (market, community or 
household) in addition to the state, thus giving rise to a pluri-scalar 
module (Dale 1997). It is therefore the coordination of these indepen-
dent activities by state and non-state actors/institutions that signals the 
rise of governance. This does not mean that the state is absent from 
governance activities, in fact the state is still actively present »through its 
role as ›coordinator in chief‹ that determines by whom and under what 
conditions government will be accomplished« (Dale 2005, 129). How-
ever, because of space constraints, the paper will only focus on educatio-
nal governance activities during transitologies. For us, educational gover-
nance activities during political transitions represent a new and distinc-
tive aspect in the study of the rise of pluri-scalar governance in that 
»transitological moments« (Cowen 2000) help us to understand the pro-
cess of rescaling governance activities during times of crisis.  
Tunisia’s pre-independence educational system can be categorized in 
»pre-protectorate education« and »protectorate education.« Such a 
distinction draws attention to the scalar dynamics of educational reform 
in Tunisia and to why its subsequent leaders broke from the past to pro-
ject an »imagined community« around education reform. It is during the 
transition from a French protectorate to an independent country in 1956 
that we see the evolution of different scales of educational governance 
activities as well as how new policyscapes were constructed to protect 
these activities. Long before Tunisia became a protectorate of France, 
education was of high priority in the North African country. With one of 
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
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the most advanced Muslim educational systems in the Maghreb region, 
traditional education in the 19th century largely consisted of religious 
schools (madrassas). A small percentage of Tunisian children attended 
Islamic primary schools, kuttabs, where students learned the Qur’an 
thoroughly (Ling 1979). These small schools were often connected to 
local mosques and were privately funded. The most promising students 
furthered their religious studies by attending city mosques—the most 
prestigious among them being Ez Zitouna mosque and university, 
located in Tunis (DeGorge 2002; Sizer 1971). Founded in 734 C. E. and 
technically a secondary school, Ez Zitouna was considered the most 
important center of Islamic scholarship in the Maghreb region (Berry 
and Rinehart 1987). In the pre-protectorate period, educational gover-
nance activities were imbedded in religiosity, since the curriculum largely 
focused on the Arabic language and the Qur’an, with similar pedagogical 
methods as kuttabs, albeit much more advanced (Green 1978). The small 
number of graduates from the mosque often took positions as Islamic 
teachers or judges in Sharia courts, or became members of the Ulama 
ranks—an exclusive group of religious leaders (Green 1978; Micaud 
1964). As Tunisia began to take steps towards modernization in the 19th 
century, Ez Zitouna remained conservative and aimed to keep »Islamic 
tradition alive by carrying out its ritual and legal duties« (Sizer 1971, 6). 
Gaining acceptance into Ez Zitouna was difficult, with only 800–900 
students enrolled annually (Green 1978). Students had to have graduated 
with high standing from a kuttab, be at least 12 years old, able to read 
and write, and have a large portion of the Qur’an memorized (Sizer 
1971). In the 1870s, Prime Minister Khair al-Din, who had lived in 
Europe in the 1860s, began to focus his attention on modernizing Tuni-
sian educational institutions, especially Ez Zitouna, whose educational 
governance activities were still religiously driven. Since graduates of the 
university often held bureaucratic positions, he aimed to reform the 
university to match the needs of contemporary Tunisians (Perkins 1986). 
In the end, Ez Zitouna and is educational activities remained conserva-
tive, with few changes to the curriculum.  
Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities  InterDisciplines 2 (2014) 
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On the initiative of Prime Minister Mohammed al Sodok, Sadiki College 
(technically a secondary school) was established and opened its doors in 
1875. The modern college aimed to train young Tunisians for state ser-
vice (Perkins 1986) and offered gifted Tunisians lessons in European 
languages and sciences (Anderson 1986). Sadiki’s curriculum was divided 
into three sections and spanned eight years. The first two sections 
covered »the Koran [Qur’an], grammar, literature, rhetoric, logic, and 
jurisprudence. The third section was optional and reserved for the most 
gifted« (Sizer 1971, 7). Languages offered under the third section con-
sisted of Turkish, French, and Italian. The college also offered instruc-
tion in rational sciences, although instructors (some foreign) were advi-
sed to »inculcate love of the Faith and to discourage questioning from 
the students« (Sizer 1971, 7). The Sadiki design was an »early model of 
bilingual and bi-cultural education« (Sizer 1971, 7) and became the stan-
dard for future educational endeavors under French rule.  
When the French took control of Tunisia in 1881, they found an educa-
tion system consisting of kuttabs, Ez Zitouna, and Sadiki College. French 
officials originally stated that little changes would be made to the Tuni-
sian education system, but a growing European population, from 77,000 
in 1895 to 129,000 in 1905, put pressure on the government to provide 
more European educational institutions (Sizer 1971). The first 
transitological moment of education in Tunisia commenced in 1883 
when the education system was placed under la Direction de l’Enseignement 
Public, with Louis Machuel appointed Director of Education (Green 
1978). Machuel was put in charge of all schools, including religious 
institutions. The newly established school system closely resembled and 
was integrated with the school system in France (Sizer 1971). By estab-
lishing a unified system, officials intended to draw the European and 
Tunisian populations together. The institutional expansion of 
assimilationist Francophone education policies aimed to create »an elite 
cherishing metropolitan values—Black Frenchman« (Clignet and Foster 
1964, 191), leading to a centralized political framework with some local 
autonomy. For the French administration, the main goal of education 
was »that a modern education would facilitate relations between France 
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and the native people by fostering an understanding of the Arab-Islamic 
culture and the newly arrived European cultures« (DeGorge 2002, 580–
81). Further, the government needed an educated Tunisian workforce to 
fill government positions. It is within this transition that we see the crea-
tion of a separate schooling system and policyscape in which governance 
activities are state-motivated and meant to fulfill bureaucratic 
requirements. 
Taking a modest approach, Louis Machuel left the kuttabs, untouched 
and established new Franco-Arab schools to pragmatically instruct both 
French and Tunisian students in modern subjects in French. These 
schools were loosely modeled after the bi-cultural Sadiki design, with 
Arabic and Italian taught as second languages. Some geography of the 
North African region was included. The schools were intended to be 
open to all citizens (French and Tunisian), but many Tunisian Muslim 
students were excluded because of their low proficiency in French (Sizer 
1971). Although the schools achieved some success in desegregating 
European and Tunisian students, the proportion of French to Tunisian 
students remained unequal throughout the protectorate—the schools 
never enrolled more than a fifth of the region’s eligible students (Perkins 
1986). Along with the new Franco-Arab schools, the French administra-
tion also opened a European-style French secondary school, Lycée Carnot, 
in 1881. This school utilized the same system as lycées in France, and the 
entire staff was French. Again, as in the Franco-Arab schools, the langu-
age of instruction was French (DeGorge 2002). Historically, we can see 
that the establishment of the Franco-Arabic schools and lycées represents 
the first movement of governance activities away from religious control 
and towards the rise of the state as chief coordinator within a very 
centralized French bureaucratic system. The modern approaches 
employed by the new educational division favored a European education 
system; traditional Arabic schools and the Arabic language were viewed 
as inferior and were paid little heed.  
In considering the pluri-scalar appeal of educational governance and the 
»tiered nature of political authority in addition to that located nationally« 
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(Lingard and Rawolle 2011, 99) we suggest that a plausible hypothesis of 
educational activities of governance within transitory post-spaces is 
driven by educational framings at the political level. For example, one of 
the earliest political framings of educational governance activities was the 
opening of Sadiki College in 1875, which was a calculated move by 
Prime Minister Mohammed al Sodok. The Sadiki design is an example of 
how political processes and interactions yield surprisingly effective 
educational reforms during different transitological moments, when the 
foci of activities, actors/agents, and scales of governance are endo-
genously developed and reformed to accommodate the structures and 
processes of modernity—placing considerable attention on the nation-
state, national education systems, and the individual (see Chabbott 2003; 
Meyer et al. 1997). 
Sadiki College remained the premier center of learning. With its highly 
competitive entrance examinations, »its graduates were almost assured 
government positions by virtue of their advanced training in modern 
subjects and in the increasingly important French language« (Perkins 
1986, 88–89). Graduates from Sadiki and the other modern education 
establishments began to criticize the recently adopted education system. 
They argued for their own society’s need »to make room for concepts 
and practices then current in the West but without discarding the Arabo-
Islamic traditions in which it rested« (Perkins 1986, 92). In response to 
their concerns, alumni began publishing a new newspaper—al Hadira—
that promoted societal change while maintaining Islamic principles 
(Perkins 1896). This led to the opening of a new educational organiza-
tion in 1896, Khalduniyyah, which was designed to provide a European 
curriculum for students attending Zitouna in addition to their Islamic 
education (Anderson 1986). Although the Sadiki graduates worked in 
tandem with French officials to establish Khaldiuniyya (Micaud 1964), 
officials became concerned that the modern education system was »crea-
ting an educated elite who could cause political problems« (DeGorge 
2002, 583). Their concerns were substantiated; Tunisians became less 
passive and more concerned with maintaining their culture while 
simultaneously demanding access to schools with modern curricula. 
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These political reformers became known as Jeunes Tunisiens, named after 
the Turkish revolutionaries, the Young Turks (DeGorge 2002). One of 
their most salient demands was to make modern education more readily 
available to all Tunisians, in both urban and rural areas. As a result, the 
Department of Public Education began to deny access to European-style 
education for Tunisians (Anderson 1986).  
This initial pushback from French officials did not last long. From 1914 
to 1942, student attendance and the number of schools established to 
educate both Tunisians and the French increased. In 1914, Tunisia’s 
education system consisted of 30 private schools and 288 public schools. 
Most of the schools were primary schools, along with one lycée for boys, 
a secondary school for girls, two colleges, two normal schools, and a 
professional school. In 1942, in addition to new primary schools, techni-
cal and professional training institutes were opened. Further, jardine 
scolaries were established for practical training in agriculture (Sizer 1971). 
Finally, putting the educational processes in perspective, a conference 
was held in Tunis in 1949 to address educational issues and »proposals 
called for teaching methods suitable for the Tunisian child, programs 
adapted to local realities, and the use of Arabic as a vehicular language« 
(Sizer 1971, 12). The conference, along with a report commissioned by 
the French government, brought a twenty-year plan, to fruition, the Plan 
de Scolarisation Totale de la Tunisie (1949–1969), which expanded France’s 
educational governance activities within Tunisia. The plan addressed 
demographic, economic, and cultural concerns within the current educa-
tion system, such as providing educational options for girls, preparing 
students to aid in the development of the country, and the need for an 
elite Arab-Muslim class to fill government positions. The plan succeeded 
in increasing the population of children receiving an education, but »the 
proportion of eligible children in school remained between thirty and 
thirty-five percent« (Sizer 1971, 16). Education continued to be for the 
elite and wealthy.  
In sum, by the 19th century, Tunisian educational governance activities 
existed in bifurcated and stratified policyscapes, with a traditional system 
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dating back centuries and linked to religion, and an elitist, centralized, 
French, state-driven system. Individual activities, funding, provision, 
ownership, and regulation during the pre-independence period were divi-
ded among different entities and across different scales. By the end of 
the protectorate in 1956, only ten percent of the population was recei-
ving an education (DeGorge 2002). Traditional Tunisian schools were 
nearly the same as in the pre-protectorate era, and the »French system 
was merely juxtaposed to it, more modern in outlook, but transposed 
directly from France with little adaption to local needs« (Sizer 1971, 18). 
Although the reforms brought about during French rule created more 
schools, they also created an educational space that was highly complex 
and incongruous.  
Transitologies and imagined post-spaces  
In post-spaces, the broader narratives of transitologies show traces of 
Robertson’s (2012) typology discussed above, especially the condition, 
discourse, project, and scale that define government mechanisms. 
Whereas governance activities were splintered in the protectorate period, 
a vertical comparison shows that during the independence period, gover-
nance activities were streamlined under the control of the state appara-
tus. In applying Robertson’s (2012) conceptual approach to the study of 
governance activities, we suggest that in post-spaces, conditions of the 
world shape notions of modernity as embedded in post-colonial projects 
that in turn fashion the activities of governances. We see the project as 
challenges confronting educational activities, framed in a way that 
prioritizes the state’s agenda. Discourse uses transitologies to project an 
illusion of what can be possible once there is a radical discontinuity from 
the past and scale constitutes the ways in which actors frame reform. 
Cowen (2000) warns that transitologies are dramatic and occur quickly; 
however our HPA shows that Tunisia’s post-independence educational 
transitologies are now in their third wave. The first wave of transitologies 
began in the post-independence period of Tunisia’s release from France 
as a protectorate, when the educational policyscape was transferred to 
the new post-protectorate administration.  
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In 1957, the French proclaimed Tunisia a republic and subsequently 
named Habib Bourguiba—»father of the nation,« »Supreme Warrior,« 
and »Combatant, Supreme«—president. Bourguiba swiftly placed educa-
tion at the forefront of his agenda, and stressed the importance of educa-
tion for social advancement (Rossi 1967). Bourguiba’s governmental 
activities placed emphasis on expanding educational access, both in 
urban and in rural areas, to provide more opportunities for all children in 
Tunisia, not solely the elite. The country had a long way to go—at 
Independence »less than one quarter of Tunisian children were in pri-
mary schools, and fewer than five percent of the school-aged population 
had been exposed to modern secondary education« (Berry and Rinehart 
1987, 128). The Education Act of 1958 attempted to remedy this. Within 
the post-protectorate policyscape created by Bourguiba, all educational 
governance activities were absorbed with developing the necessary 
human resources for the modernization project as conceived by him. 
The fundamental tenants of Bourguiba’s modernization project, and the 
evolution of appropriate governance activities, were voiced within the 
1956 Code du Statut Personnel (Code of Personal Status) that went into 
effect in 1957. The code prohibited polygamy, granted women and men 
the same rights, introduced a minimum age for marriage, permitted 
women to initiate divorce, and mandated the right to education for 
women. As part of Bourguiba’s new educational policyscape, school 
curricula and textbooks were modernized to reduce religious influence 
while simultaneously widening participation.  
The 1958 ten-year education plan not only addressed educational access 
and expansion, but also aimed at both the unification and Tunisification 
of the country (Fryer and Jules 2012; Sizer 1971). This move thus 
cemented the government’s role, a clear change in governance practices. 
In the post-protectorate policyscape, the Tunisification process was 
embedded in the governance activity of regulation. Bourguiba’s aim was 
to ensure that education was a central component of the state apparatus. 
The Tunisification process had three core elements: »(i) evoking history; 
(ii) enhancing culture and religion; and (iii) promoting gender equity« 
(Fryer and Jules 2012). Education in the immediate post-independence 
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period used »education to create citizen-subjects […] in which 
Westernization and Tunisian Islamic culture would be ›synthesized‹« 
(Champagne 2007, 204). After decades of French rule, the country 
needed to establish a unique Tunisian identity. Further, the government 
desired a cadre of workers that could replace French personnel and 
improve the economic conditions of the country. All educational 
institutions were first placed under one secular institution (DeGorge 
2002), the Ministry of Education (MOE), which strove to reform educa-
tion from the ground up. Higher education reform was placed on hold 
until more Tunisian youths were prepared for university level courses 
(Sizer 1971). Although the plan set out to transform the current educa-
tion system, the French model still provided the framework for the 
Tunisian government.  
Universal primary education, free to all Tunisian children, was the first 
goal—set to be accomplished by 1968 (Sizer 1971). Every child had the 
right to primary education; however, secondary education was designed 
to be more selective. Beginning at age six, Tunisian children were to 
attend primary school for a total of seven years. Soon after the national 
plan went into effect, overcrowding issues arose and the quality of 
education deteriorated (Allman 1979). Further, there was a shortage of 
qualified teachers and space. To rectify these issues, the MOE cut weekly 
school hours in half during the first two years of primary school, from 
30 to 15, which allowed schools to operate in shifts. Students attended 
school for 25 hours a week and the seventh year of primary school was 
eliminated (Allman 1979; Sizer 1971). Utilizing a bilingual approach, 
students were taught in Arabic for the first two years and then were 
instructed for ten hours a day in French from the third year on. While 
the French model of schooling continued to permeate the Tunisian 
educational infrastructure, the Tunisification, or nationalization, of Tuni-
sia became an integral part of the revamped education system (Sizer 
1971).  
The Education Act limited secondary education, which was considered 
selective, but not elitist. Entrance was gained through high scores on a 
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competitive national exam taken during the last year of primary school. 
The duration of secondary school was six years. However, after the first 
year of general instruction, students were tracked into different fields— 
making students more adept in certain subjects (Allman 1979). Early 
specialization also aimed to prepare students for universities, specifically 
universities considered more modern. After Independence and the 
centralization of governance activities under the state, religious instituti-
ons lost their appeal and were considered impractical (Micaud 1964). Ez 
Zitouna’s prestige wavered, especially after the creation of the University 
of Tunis in 1960, which catered to students who wished to fill positions 
formerly held by the French or students who wished to go abroad for 
work or study (Rossi 1967).  
For the most post, Tunisians considered the reforms successful. By 
1967, 90 percent of school-aged boys and 50 percent of girls were recei-
ving a primary education (Sizer 1971). However, a report released in the 
same year resulted in some alterations to the 1958 plan. As more stu-
dents attended school, issues relating to educational quality became 
prevalent. In some areas, primary education was increased to the original 
30 hours a week, and all primary classrooms became co-educational. The 
plan also encouraged smaller class sizes (Sizer 1971).  
Throughout the rest of Bourguiba’s presidency, he focused on the gover-
nance activity of educational provision that contributed to the rise in 
school attendance in primary school and secondary school. However, 
low quality remained an on-going issue. The University of Tunis conti-
nued to expand and gain prestige, although many qualified students 
chose to attend universities abroad. All things considered, by the mid-
1980s the reforms did what they had intended—most primary and 
secondary school teachers were Tunisian rather than French, school 
attendance drastically increased (DeGorge 2002), and more attention was 
brought to the distinctive culture and language of the Tunisian people. 
This, of course, did not occur without considerable investments. From 
1980–1990, 27 percent of the state budget was spent on national 
education.  
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In 1988, the second transitological moment occurred as the post-
Bourguiba imagined community was constructed by Ben Ali after he 
took office. The »palace coup« that brought the peaceful transition from 
Bourguiba to Ben Ali, known as le Changement (the change), was domina-
ted by le Pacte National (the National Pact)—political and economic 
reforms to encourage foreign investment (Borowiec 1998). In the post-
Bourguiba policyscape, we see the rise of three myths (the economic 
miracle, democratic gradualism, and laicite) that shaped educational 
governance activities, ultimately providing fertile ground for the rise of 
the post-Ben Ali policyscape. While Ben Ali preserved and expanded the 
foundational attributes of Bourguiba’s educational governance activities 
to guarantee political stability and security under the »presidential 
democracy« system, several myths permeated the post-Bourguiba space. 
Ben Ali wanted to distance himself wherever possible from Bourguiba’s 
educational governance activities, which were founded on Western ideas 
and the principle of modernization. The three myths mentioned above 
are central to the ways in which education was projected in the post-
Bourguiba period and has its roots in the 1989 education reforms that 
sought to »reshape [educational] structures according to a rational 
approach that takes into account the national reality, inspired of success 
instances worldwide« (MOEHRST 2008, 71) and provided »compulsory 
and free basic schooling […] redefined the mission and finalities of 
education, restructured secondary education« (MOET 2002, 10–11). This 
reform not only sought to respond to the gaps in student performance 
across the system, but was also Ben Ali’s way of suggesting to the 
international community that not only was Tunisia serious about addres-
sing its educational deficits, but also that Tunisia embraced modernity 
and democratic governance. However Cavatorta and Haugbølle (2012) 
suggest that this projection of embracing modernization and educational 
reforms was a myth. In 2002, Ben Ali engaged upon the second set of 
reforms in the post-Bourguiba era. Ben Ali’s reforms were based on 
»social liberalism« (Mbougueng 1999), since they adopted aspects of neo-
liberal market reforms in conjunction with heavy state intervention in 
the social sector. In this context, the Educational Reform Act states that 
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»education aims at cultivating fidelity and loyalty in students to Tunisia« 
(MOET 2002, 5) while increasing their »capacity for self-education and 
[…] prepar[ing] them for access to the educated community« (MOET 
2002, 9). The link between Ben Ali’s aim to develop an educated popu-
lace while projecting the notion of himself as a democratic leader was the  
Tunisian economic miracle […] [where the leadership sought] to 
tackle the most pressing problems of the country and then 
generate sufficient growth to be able to defuse social tensions in 
order to open up the political system without risking the growth of 
Islamic extremism (read Islamism), as economic success could be 
used to undermine the attraction of political Islam. (Cavatorta and 
Haugbølle 2012, 183). 
During the post-Bourguiba era, Ben Ali increased spending on education 
—6.3 percent of the gross national product in 1993—and focused 
attention on cultivating competencies, including: (i) practical (mathema-
tics, science, computer science, and technology); (ii) strategic (organize, 
analyze, and search for correct information); (iii) initiative (spirit of 
creativity); and (iv) behavioral (senses of responsibility, self-reliance, and 
cooperation (MOEHRST 2008). There is no clear evidence whether 
there is a connection to the investment in education, but Tunisia’s 
annual growth rate did increase from 5 to 6 percent between 1996 and 
2005. In 2005, another set of educational reforms called for »a large 
scientific and technological partnership with overseas« (MOEHRST 
2008, 155) as part of »Tunisia Tomorrow«—a set of reforms introduced 
in 2005 that focused on technological partnerships. In light of these 
reforms, it is ironic that one of the most important reasons for the post-
Ben Ali transitology period was high unemployment among young 
people, especially university graduates, which rose from 30 percent in 
2009 to 45 percent in 2011. Distinctive in the development of the post-
Bourguiba space is the movement from the process of Tunisification 
towards liberalization of entry into the global market. For example, while 
reforms drew on Tunisia’s historical past, they also projected a sense of 
Ben Ali’s performance legitimation in that higher education reforms sug-
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gest »the university will […] boost the comprehensive process of econo-
mic development. It will remain an inexhaustible source of creation and 
innovation […] So that Tunisia remains forever, the symbol of science, 
culture and civilization which it has always been throughout history« 
(15). As part of Ben Ali’s projection of democratic values, the post-
Bourguiba era continued to promote »absolute equality among the 
sexes,« which was considered »the best means of social promotion« 
(MOET 2003, 17). The idea of competing internally and externally 
permeated the post-Bourguiba space, as education was expected to gene-
rate a »link between training and the labour market at the regional and 
national level« (MOET 2008, 19). 
Conclusion: Educational contagion  
In examining the role of educational developments in post-spaces, we 
suggest that several small internal shocks to Tunisia’s educational system 
were driven by political fluctuations and transformations. These ulti-
mately led to the tsunami of policy solutions that have altered the Tuni-
sian landscape, giving rise to education contagion—the spreading of 
ideas due to spillovers. In essence, one conceivable supposition is that 
educational contagion is a byproduct of the educational governance 
activities that are utilized during different transitological moments.  
In focusing on the evolutionary dynamics of governance activities, 
transitological moments within transitologies, we suggest that future 
research should now be able to identify how activities eventually spilled 
over as transitological periods expanded. Essentially, while the post-
protectorate policyscape cemented governance activities under the state 
apparatus to achieve modernization in the post-Bourguiba policyscape, le 
Changement was utilized to consolidate crucial decisions under the 
»presidential system« in the post-Ben Ali policyscape, which continues to 
be an extension of earlier scales of governance activities. Thus educatio-
nal contagion, or the spillover effects, ultimately cemented the seeds of 
the Tunisian Uprising, or »Jasmine Revolution« as coined by the Western 
media, and the ensuing Arab Spring. Based on our analysis, we suggest 
that the Tunisian Uprising not only went against the dictatorship per se, 
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but also against the policyscapes that different governance activities had 
created, expanded, and maintained over time. After all, it was the 
centralized bureaucratic system that funded, provided, owned, and 
regulated the independent activities of education, and it was the products 
of the system, its human capital, that rose up against the state apparatus 
when they could not find employment. While we recognize that several 
factors contributed to the demise of the Ben Ali regime after 23 years of 
governance, we advance that educational contagion ultimately shaped the 
pre-revolutionary events and the extent to which they spilled over, given 
that 43.7% of the population were aged 15–39 and were products of 
post-protectorate governance activities. An example of educational con-
tagion can be seen in the evolution of political slogans as the uprisings 
progressed from an initial call for »employment is a right, oh gang of 
thieves« and »bread and water, not Trabulsis3« to calls that »the people 
want to bring down the regime« (Sadiqi 2011, 21). Other slogans, such as 
»the people want to topple the regime,« invoked aspects of the work of 
the Tunisian poet Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi, who died in 1933 at age 25. 
In returning briefly to the situatedness or embeddedness of transversal 
comparisons, a second example illustrates how, as the state cemented 
control of the various educational governance activities in the post-
Bourguiba policyscape, endogenous actors were used to protect and 
legitimize this space. It is within the context that the mukhabarat became 
the disciplinary arm of the neo-corporatist security state that arose in the 
post-Bourguiba policyscape. The mukhabarat had its hands in all 
educational governance activities, since it infiltrated all spheres of Tuni-
sian society as Ben Ali consolidated his presidential democracy. At its 
height, there were close to a 130,000 mukhabarat employed to protect the 
security of the state, with the university system having its own heavy-
handed mukhabarat division, which functioned in an atmosphere of 
impunity and maintained an air of fear to keep university students and 
officials in line.  
                                                
3  Refers collectively to the family members of Leïla Ben Ali, second wife 
of President Zine El Abidine Ben Al. 
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In putting forth educational contagion as a theoretical module with 
which to understand the multi-scalarity and multi-spatiality that exists in 
post-authoritarian spaces, we trace the metamorphoses of educational 
policies within Tunisia’s authoritarian space to examine the 
conceptualization and actualizations of empirical research on education. 
The post-Ben Ali periods have begun with destroying and discrediting 
the historical, social, and professional past (Cowen 2002). In this paper 
we have made two observations: (i) we have advanced a way of studying 
post-spaces in the hope that we can better understand the type of 
transitological processes that states go through as different educational 
systems are restructured after the collapse of a regime and (ii) we have 
suggested that in the case of Tunisia, the transitological process has 
given rise to educational contagion at different policyscales. In the post-
space, projected globality is not embedded in the governances negotia-
ted, but instead stems from educational contagion. In essence, over time 
these various projections have occurred in small shocks that now shape 
Tunisian society within the post-space.  
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